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to them, by representatives of every school of ethical or religious thought. Neither in antiquity, nor in the Middle Ages, nor in the sixteenth century, nor in the England of the Puritans and Cavaliers had the " man of feeling " ever been a popular type.
It is true that a solution of the problem has been offered usa solution which in recent years has won wide acceptance among students of English literature. It has been observed that most if not all of the distinctive elements of the sentimental benevolism of the mid-eighteenth century already existed at the beginning of the century in the writings of the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and it has been noted that the aristocratic author of the Characteristics, for all the suspicions which could be cast on his religious orthodoxy, enjoyed a very considerable vogue in intellectual circles during the four or five decades following his death; from these facts the conclusion has been drawn that it was mainly from Shaftesbury and his immediate disciples that the impulses came which affected both the literary creators of the " man of feeling " and his admirers among the public. 4 The chief difficulty with this explanation is that it begins too late. If we wish to understand the origins and the widespread diffusion in the eighteenth century of the ideas which issued in the cult of sensibility, we must look, I believe, to a period considerably earlier than that in which Shaftesbury wrote and take into account the propaganda of a group of persons whose opportunities for moulding the thoughts of ordinary Englishmen were much greater than those of even the most aristocratic of deists. What I would suggest, in short, is that the key to the popular triumph of " sentimentalism " toward 1750 is to be sought, not so much in the teaching of individual lay moralists after 1700, as in the combined influence of numerous Anglican divines of the Latitudinarian tradition who from the Restoration onward into the eighteenth century had preached to their congregations and, through their books, to the larger public essentially the same ethics of benevolence, " good nature," and " tender sentimental feeling " as was expressed in the passages from Fordyce and his anonymous contemporary quoted at the beginning of this paper.5
In order to make this clear it will be necessary to consider somewhat at length four principal aspects of the ethical and psychological propaganda of these divines during the period from about 1660 to about 1725.
1. Virtue as universal benevolence.-That the teaching of the Latitudinarian clergy should have assumed from the first a strongly humanitarian bent is not surprizing in the light of the purposes which animated the earliest leaders of the movement. Along with other aims which need not concern us here, it was the fervent hope of the " Latitude-men " that they might succeed in freeing the religion of the English people from those errors concerning the nature of God and the value of human works which had been spread by the Puritans. Their characteristic views on both these questions were clearly summarized by Joseph Glanvill, himself an adherent of the party, in an essay published in 1676.
They took notice [he wrote], what unworthy and dishonourable Opinions were publish'd abroad concerning God, to the disparagement of all his Attributes, and discouragement of vertuous Endeavours, and great trouble and dejection of many pious Minds; and therefore here they appear'd also to assert and vindicate the Divine Goodness and love of Men in its freedom and extent, against those Doctrines, that made his Love, Fondness; and his Justice, Cruelty, and represented God, as the Eternal Hater of the far greatest part of his reasonable Creatures, and the designer of their Ruine, for the exaltation of meer Power, and arbitrary Will: Against these sowr and dismal Opinions They stood up stoutly, in a time when the Assertors of the Divine Purity and Goodness, were persecuted bitterly with nicknames of Reproach, and popular Hatred.... They shew'd continually how impossible it was that Infinite Goodness should design or delight in the misery of his Creatures: . . . That I have brought together some of the evidence in the Philological Quarterly 11 (1932 With this general outlook, it was natural that they should become great preachers of the social virtues. And few things, indeed, were more characteristic of these Latitudinarian divines than the assiduity with which they exhorted their hearers and readers to benevolent feelings and acts as the best means at once of actualizing the beneficent designs of God for man and of realizing the aim of religion to perfect human nature. Charity was one of their favorite themes: not the charity which was primarily love of God; not charity merely to the parish poor or to fellow Christians, but a " general kindness " to all men because they are men, an active desire to relieve their sufferings, if not to alter the social conditions in which they live; the kind of charity best described by the words-more common in the eighteenth century, but already coming into use-" humanity," " good nature," " universal benevolence."
Of this strain in their preaching numerous illustrations could be given from the Restoration onward. The sermons of Isaac Barrow (d. 1677) were particularly rich in expressions of the theme, and his discourse on The Duty and Reward of Bounty to the Poor (1671) remained a classic with readers of humanitarian sympathies for nearly a hundred years.12 To Tillotson likewise the subject had a strong appeal: " How much better it is," he wrote in a typical passage, " to do good, to be really useful and beneficial to others, and how much more clearly and certainly our Duty, than to quarrel about doubtful and uncertain Opinions." 13 For Samuel Parker, as for his master Cumberland, the principle to which all the laws of nature could be reduced was " universal Justice or Humanity, or so much love and good-will to all Mankind, as obliges every man to seek the welfare and happiness of the whole Community and every Member of it, as well as his own private and particular and Charity of Christians, the obligation to do good to all men derives its force not merely from the fact that charity is enjoined upon us by Christ and his apostles; the obligation also has its basis in common humanity, since to "c Man only of all Creatures under Heaven, God has given this quality, to be affected with the Grief and with the Joy of those of his own kind; and to feel the Evils which others feel, that we may be universally disposed to help and relieve one another."'? 5 In the early eighteenth century the current of this humanitarian homiletic was flowing more strongly than ever. It was not necessary to read the works of the Earl of Shaftesbury to learn that " to love the public, to study universal good, and to promote the interest of the whole world, as far as lies within our power, is surely the height of goodness, and makes that temper which we call divine "; "I the same lesson was being taught from hundreds of pulpits in London and the provinces by clergymen who had inherited the benevolistic spirit of their Latitudinarian predecessors of the generation before. Typical of these was Samuel Clarke, preaching in 1705 on The Great Duty of Universal Love:
The true End and Design of Religion, is manifestly this; to make Men wiser and better; to improve, exalt, and perfect their Nature; to teach them to obey, and love, and imitate God; to cause them to extend their were thus helping to set the tone of eighteenth-century humanitarian exhortation, the words " charity " and " benevolence " had a double sense, connoting not only the serviceable and philanthropic actions which the good man performs but still more the tender passions and affections which prompt to these actions and constitute their immediate reward. For this emphasis they had, it is true, an excellent warrant in various New Testament texts.20 But there was more to their frequent statements of the idea than merely a development of I Corinthians 13, and an adequate explanation must also take into account the pronounced strain of anti-Stoicism which throughout the period characterized their ethical thought.
How consciously in revolt they were against the distrust of the passions and the exaggerated assumptions concerning man's rationality which they attributed to the Stoics can be seen in numerous places in their writings.21 The passions, they insisted with Aristotle, are neither good nor evil in themselves; they may, however, be ordered to virtue, and when so ordered they have a positive value, since they and not our weak reason are the forces which make it possible for us to act at all; to wish to eradicate them from our nature is not only a futile but a 
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students that the moral ideal of that age was one of " cold intellectuality." 25 Such in any case was not the ideal preached by these Latitudinarian divines. And in nothing was their revolt against " the Stoic's pride " more evident than in their repudiation of the notion that though the good man must relieve the distresses of others he must not allow himself to be emotionally affected by the misfortunes he sees.
The doctrine against which they protested was familiar to the seventeenth century in the pages of Seneca 26 and of his various modern disciples. To this creed of " stoical insensibility" our divines opposed what they insisted was the true Christian idea of a charity which derives both its force and value from the fact that the good man does permit himself to be "inwardly disturbed." There can be no effective benevolence, they declared again and again, that does not spring from the tender emotions of pity and compassion, and so far from suppressing these emotions we ought rather to look upon them as the marks which distinguish men of genuine goodness from those who are merely righteous or just. Not the Senecan wise man, relieving but not pitying, but the tenderhearted Christian, pitying before he relieves, was the ideal which they preached to their generation; and as time went on their emphasis tended more and more to dwell on those elements of " softness" and quick emotional response to the spectacle of human misery which were to constitute for the eighteenth century the peculiar traits of the " man of feeling." Of the many clergymen of the half century following the Restoration who helped to disseminate this kind of " sentimentalism "-a " sentimentalism ' still distinctively Christian in its background and expression-it is possible to consider only a few. Let us begin with Robert South, commenting in a sermon of 1662 on the difference between the moral teaching of Christians and that of the Stoics: Sorrow in their esteem was a sin scarce to be expiated by another; to pity, was a fault; to rejoice, an extravagance. . . . To us let this be sufficient, that our Saviour Christ, who took upon him all our natural infirmities, but none of our sinful, has been seen to weep, to be sorrowful, to pity, and to be angry: which shows that there might be gall in a dove, passion without sin, fire without smoke, and motion without disturbance.29
The essential doctrine is here, but the tone and emphasis are still those of the seventeenth century rather than the eighteenth. This can also be said of a development on the same theme in Richard Kidder's Chanrty Directed (1676) [In the character of the " good " man there is a certain] softening quality. 'Tis that which our Language very happily expresses by Good Nature.... Indeed, goodness is the only excellence in Man, that deserves to be belov'd or priz'd. Good nature is all that a Man is good for in the World; without which, his riches only make him insolent, and his knowledge will but make him vain, and all his other admired qualities, render him the more dangerous, and suspected, and unfit for humane conversation. Nay, without this Goodness, and benignity of Mind, Righteousness is nothing else but Interest, and Vertue nothing but design, and Religion it self will dwindle either into frowardness, or formality.38
The word " sensibility," when these passages were written, had not yet come into fashion in the sense in which it was chiefly to be used by the writers and public of the mid-eighteenth century. It is clear, however, that the quality of mind later eulogized under the name of " sensibility " or " moral weeping" by the sentimentalists of the 1740's and 1750's was no other than the quality which was already being recommended so warmly as the distinguishing sign of the benevolent man by these anti-Stoic preachers of the later 1600's. Of the many important issues raised for them by the publication of the Leviathan in 1651 we need concern ourselves with only one: the issue involved in Hobbes' contention, which was indeed central to his whole political theory, that without a government possessed of complete power the natural passions of man would lead to a state of constant social war. The " Lawes of Nature," he had written, " (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to,) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like." 38 And the reason is, as he said in another passage, that " men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example." So that it is manifest, Hobbes concluded, " that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man." 39 It is easy to understand why this doctrine should have aroused the opposition of our divines. By reducing all human motivation to egoistic passions of pride and self-esteem, Hobbes, it seemed clear to them, had gone far toward making not only political justice but morality itself a purely arbitrary thing, dependent wholly upon the will of those in power. To offset so distasteful a conclusion it was obviously necessary to show the falsity of the conception of human nature upon which it rested. They devoted themselves, therefore, with much energy, to maintaining, against the Leviathan, that the nature of men is such that even without government they can be trusted to live together peacefully in sympathetic and helpful mutual relations. Our divines were not the first, of course, to uphold this thesis, and they made much of the fact that in Aristotle, in Cicero, in Juvenal, to say nothing of other classical and patristic authors, the capacity of human beings for amicable social living had been set in a much fairer light than in the writings of the cynical philosopher of Malmsbury.40 But this did not prevent them from frequently giving to the old commonplaces a new turn and force or from developing them in some directions far beyond anything contained in the ancient texts. From the point of view of the present study the most significant result of their efforts was the dissemination of the idea that man is essentially a gentle and sympathetic creature, naturally inclined to society not merely by his intellect, which tells him that kindness to others is the best means to the end of his own private happiness, but still more by " those passions and inclinations that are common to him with other Creatures " and which, like everything in his nature, have " a vehement tendency to acts of love and good-will." 41 Among ing the common sense of men, which in this loose and vain world hath lately got such vogue, that all men naturally are enemies one to another." 42 The truth is, he insisted, that if the practice of benevolent acts is our duty it is in part because such acts are in accord with, and not, as Hobbes had said, contrary to, our natural passions.
We are indispensably obliged to these duties, because the best of our natural inclinations prompt us to the performance of them, especially those of pity and benignity, which are manifestly discernible in all, but most powerful and vigorous in the best natures; and which, questionless, by the most wise and good Author of our beings were implanted therein both as monitors to direct, and as spurs to incite us to the performance of our duty. For the same bowels, that, in our want of necessary sustenance, do by a lively sense of pain inform us thereof, and instigate us to provide against it, do in like manner grievously resent the distresses of another, and thereby admonish us of our duty, and provoke us to relieve them. Even the stories of calamities, that in ages long since past have happened to persons nowise related to us, yea, the fabulous reports of tragical events, do (even against the bent of our wills, and all resistance of reason) melt our hearts with compassion, and draw tears from our eyes; and thereby evidently signify that general sympathy which naturally intercedes between all men, since we can neither see, nor hear of, nor imagine another's grief, without being afflicted ourselves. Antipathies may be natural to wild beasts [here he refers in a note to a well-known passage in Juvenal's fifteenth satire]; but to rational creatures they are wholly unnatural.43
Another expounder of the same doctrine was Samuel Parker, whose Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature (1681) was designed in the main as a reply to Hobbes. All our " natural desires," he wrote, " are not only just and reasonable in themselves, but they incline us to such designs and actions, as naturally tend to the good and welfare of mankind."44 To this end in particular we have been endowed by the Creator with the passions of " Natural Pity and Compassion," the operation of which, when they have not been overlaid by contrary habits, is almost mechanical: Tho Nature inclines us to Humanity, yet Custom Acts of Kindness and Charity, they will not be easy, except they lay hold of the proper Occasions of exerting them.... So strongly is this natural Tenderness, where Nature is not one Way or another corrupted, apt to operate in us; and which therefore, from the Greeks, we very significantly render Philanthropy; from the Latins, Humtanity; and which in the Language of our own Nation, and with a particular respect to the Genius of it, we express by good Nature....52
It is no wonder that the deist Tindal in 1730, in referring to the doctrine that man is " a social creature, who naturally loves his own species, and is full of pity, tenderness & benevolence," should have prefaced his statement of it by the phrase " as our Divines maintain against Hobbs." 53
The significance of their assiduous preaching of this doctrine for the problem with which we are here concerned scarcely needs to be pointed out. The hypothesis I have tried to suggest in this paper is not intended to be taken as an adequate or in any way exclusive explanation of the rise of the mid-eighteenth-century mode of sensibility in England. There is always the influence of Shaftes-bury to be considered-a very real and important influence especially after 17925 when it was reinforced by that of his disciple Hutcheson. Even in the later seventeenth century, moreover, the ideas we have been discussing were not the exclusive property of writers of sermons. Mr. Ustick has recently called attention to their appearance in certain courtesy books of the 1680's,63 and to the examples he gives others could doubtless be added. By 1714, as every one knows, they had begun to find their way into the popular literature of essays and plays.
My intention has not been to minimize these other factors in the preparation for sentimentalism, but merely to consider whether the whole movement does not become somewhat more intelligible historically than it has hitherto seemed when we bring into the picture, also, the propaganda of benevolence and tender feeling carried on with increasing intensity since the Restoration by the anti-Puritan, anti-Stoic, and anti-Hobbesian divines of the Latitudinarian school. 
